This paper shows how firms' pricing and communications strategies may be affected by size of the Internet: firms have incentives to facilitate consumer search on the Internet, but only as long as the Internet's reach is limited. As the Internet is used by more consumers, firms' pricing and communications strategies on the Internet will mirror the strategies they pursue in a conventional channel.
Introduction
It has been predicted from early on that the emergence of the Internet as a communications channel would lead to an information explosion. Forbes Magazine, for example, wrote on May 24th, 1994, "The barriers to good information are crashing down." Such developments were expected to lead to lower prices and more competition among firms.
Evidence from the Internet appears to confirm these predictions. There are numerous cases of firms whose main presence is on the Internet offering prices that are substantially lower than firms that are considered to price competitively over retail outlets or mail order. "Buy.com," for example, offers many software products for considerably less than the competitively priced mail order giant PC/MacWarehouse. There is also evidence that many firms post large amounts of information on the Internet that would be quite difficult for consumers to obtain through retail outlets. For example, the description on Hewlett Packard's web page of each of its printers covers about four pages, including a photo, and a detailed list of features and technical specifications.
Nevertheless, using this type of evidence to further project the future direction of the Internet ignores at least two issues. First, a firm's strategy on the Internet is likely to be affected by its business in other channels, such as retailing and mail order. Second, a firm's optimal pricing and communications strategy may vary with the extent to which potential customers make use of the Internet.
The goal of this paper is to analyze ways in which the existence and the size of the Internet affects firms' optimal pricing and communications strategies. The first main result of this paper is that the amount of information firms provide and the prices they set depend on the reach of the Internet. If the Internet is "small," more information is likely to be provided than through a conventional channel alone (such as retailing); also, average prices on the Internet are likely to be lower than on the conventional channel.
1 If the Internet is "large," there need not be more information provided than through a conventional channel alone and average prices on the Internet need not be lower. In this context I am equating "providing more information" with "facilitating consumers search." Clearly this need not always be the case (see for example Jacoby, Speller, and Berning 1974 and other literature on information overload). I equate the two for expositional reasons only. Below, I will abstract from this issue by modeling firms as influencing consumers' search cost directly.
2 This paper is concerned with strategic interactions between firms. To the extent that firms have not provided information to consumers in conventional channels purely because if was too expensive to do so, the Internet's reduced cost of providing information should lead to more information being available to consumers.
The second main result and the general theoretical contribution of this paper is to show that firms can strategically use information on multiple channels to achieve finer consumer segmentation. Competing on multiple channels allows firms to provide selected groups of consumers with different amounts of information and thereby differentially affect consumers' expected utility. Firms can exploit this segmentation to increase their market power. The results suggest, somewhat counterintuitively, that a proliferation of channels will decrease competition between firms.
Although the paper considers a channel whose characteristics are particularly suggestive of the Internet, the findings generalize to other channels that can be used to communicate selectively and costeffectively with consumers. This paper contributes to the marketing literature in three areas. First, it predicts future developments regarding the amount of information provided over the Internet, firms' pricing strategies, and the profitability of competing on the Internet. Second, the paper derives implications for managers. It discusses whether conventional channel strategies should be duplicated on the Internet, whether firms should limit the information they provide, and how long-term profits will be affected by the Internet.
Third, this paper makes theoretical contributions. It introduces channels as a means of segmenting consumers by selectively informing them. It also shows that manipulating consumer information can be a powerful competitive tool. Finally, it shows that the analysis of competition between firms can be strongly affected by considering all channels over which they compete.
Other literature on marketing aspects of the Internet deals mainly with marketing implications from the way the Web changes the interaction with consumers (Hoffman and Novak 1996; Alba et al. 1997, Lynch and Ariely 2000) . Economists have focused on issues of access pricing and the pricing of information goods (MacKie-Mason and Varian 1994; Varian 1995 Varian , 1996 Brynjolfsson and Smith 1999, Bakos and Brynjolfsson 2000) . Researchers in information technology have discussed electronic markets (Malone, Yates and Benjamin 1987) and their effect of lowering search costs (Bakos 1997) .
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives the intuition behind the model I develop later in the paper and some of the results I obtain. Section 3 models competition across channels. Section 4 discusses the main result, limitations and extensions of the paper. Section 5 presents current examples, possible Internet directions and implications for managers. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Illustrative Example
Although it abstracts from the precise characteristics of a particular product market, an example can quite simply illustrate the main argument of this paper and at the same time highlight why the interdependence of firm strategies across sales channels and the reach of the Internet matter. All results that are mentioned in this example are derived in section 3.
Consider two competing, vertically integrated firms in the computer industry. Firm 1 and firm 2 sell similar products despite the fact that they pursue quite different strategies in terms of pricing and the amount of help they extend to consumers. Firm 1 facilitates consumers' search by providing well equipped computers in their company owned stores that allow consumers to evaluate the equipment, and by having well informed sales staff. At firm 2 it is very difficult for consumers to evaluate the product. Firm 2 does not provide consumers with demonstration models of their computers and has scarce and poorly informed sales personnel. Firm 1 charges somewhat higher prices than firm 2. Firms compete for home computer buyers who do not know the offerings in the category very well, and thus do not have a clear idea of the benefits they might derive from each computer. If a consumer really wants to know how much she likes a firm's computer, she needs to spend some time evaluating the product.
By learning about the computer of one firm the consumer also learns something about the category and thereby about the computer of the other firm. Even if a customer has evaluated the products of both firms, there is some chance that she finds them equally valuable.
In this example I first sketch why firms 1 and 2 would choose to facilitate consumers' search to different degrees. This will explain why they can sustain different price levels and make positive profits.
I will then look at a hypothetical situation in which firm 1 has established a very informative presence on the Internet and firm 2 has to decide which communications and pricing strategy to pursue in following firm 1 to the Internet. I consider two scenarios that differ in the percentage of interested customers that can use the Internet in addition to company owned stores. Firms can charge different prices on the two channels but these price cannot be too different from each other before it is profitable to arbitrage between the two channels.
Competition in stores . Differentiating themselves by the ease with which consumers can evaluate products at their stores allows firm 1 and firm 2 to avoid intense price competition. If firms did not differentiate themselves in this way, for example, if neither made it easy for consumers to obtain information, consumers would have to choose which product to buy on the basis of price alone. Similarly, if both firms informed consumer, then the portion of the consumers who value the products equally would also choose on the basis of price alone.
By differentiating themselves, both firms can sustain higher profits by softening price competition.
For example, if consumers are only informed by firm 1 but not by firm 2, then after evaluating firm1's computer, consumers will decide either to buy from firm 1 at a higher price but knowing what they will get or to buy from firm 2 at a lower price but with only an estimate of the value of firm 2's product to them. If consumers differ in their realized valuation for firm 1's computer, then a change in prices by either firm 1 or firm 2 will induce only a few consumers on the margin to switch from store one to the other. The "insensitive" reaction of consumers' demand softens price competition because none of the stores can capture the whole market by slightly lowering prices. This illustrates why information can be an important competitive tool. Manipulating consumer information provides a mechanism for raising prices by committing firms not to compete for customers with the same valuations since differentiating on the information provided to consumers leads to maximally heterogeneous consumer valuations.
Competition on the Internet in addition to stores . How firms compete on the Internet depends both on the strategies the firms employ in their regular stores, and on the reach of the Internet. Suppose that 10% of firm1's and firm 2's potential customers can also use the Internet and suppose that firm 1 has already built up a very informative web presence. What should firm 2 do? If firm 2 does not provide useful information about its computer on the Internet, it essentially replicates on the Internet its strategy in the regular store. The competition between the two firms does not change. If, on the other hand, firm 2 imitates firm 1 on the Internet by making it easy for those 10% of consumers to evaluate its computer, it can gain additional customers. These additional customers come from two groups: Internet consumers who, once they have evaluated both companies, either determine that they prefer firm 2's over firm 1's computer, or who cannot tell an appreciable difference between the two computers and are attracted by firm 2's lower price. As described above, if firm 2 were to imitate firm 1 through its regular store , it would induce vigorous price competition by firm 1, since too many of firm 1's customers would want to switch over to firm 2. Since the Internet's reach is small, firm 1 will not react with a price cut since the limited sustainable price difference between the two channels would require it to lower prices (and lose revenue) from the 90% of consumers that shop the retail stores. As a result, both firms will use the Internet to provide information to consumers when the reach of the Internet is small. Suppose now that the Internet reaches 95% of consumers. If firm 2 facilitates consumers' search on the Internet, the situation is similar to both firms informing consumers on the retail channel: a large number of firm 1's customers will want to switch over to firm 2 and firm 1 will react by cutting its price and initiating a price war. As a result, firm 2 will choose not to facilitate consumers' search over the Internet when the reach of the Internet is large.
This example shows that firm 2's optimal Internet strategy depends on the reach of the Internet: if the Internet is "small," more information is likely to be provided than through a conventional channel only (such as retailing). If the Internet is "large," there will not be more information provided than through a conventional channel alone. The example also highlights that a firm's strategy on the Internet is based on the strategy that both firms follow in their regular outlets.
Competition across channels
This section sets up and solves the model from which the results of this paper are derived. It contains the propositions that form the basis for the illustrative example in section 2 and covers the intuitions that underlie the results in more detail. Section 3.1 characterizes firms. Section 3.2 models consumers and introduces demand functions. Section 3.3 derives the main results of this paper. The final part of this section looks at the impact the Internet can have on competitiveness.
Firms
Firms face a mass of consumers that are interested in buying one unit of a good in the particular product category offered by the firms. Competition takes place between two vertically integrated firms.
These firms compete in prices and in the search costs that consumers incur if they want to determine the valuation they have for the product of each firm. Firms can offer consumers their products over two channels. These can be thought of as retailing, mail order, or the Internet. For the remainder of the paper I will distinguish between a conventional channel (such as retailing) and an electronic channel (the Internet). Firm sets prices and at which consumers can buy its product on the conventional and the electronic channel respectively. We can frequently (but certainly not always) observe that firms charge different prices for identical products in different channels. In much of the literature it is assumed that arbitrage will eliminate these price differences. This view ignores a possibly substantial cost of setting up a mechanism to purchase and resell products. It is, however, plausible that arbitrage
p i e will at least limit the difference in prices that a firm can charge in two channels. I thus assume that the prices that firm charges on the conventional and electronic channel can't differ by more than ,
. The magnitude of this arbitrage parameter will vary by industry. Banks, for example can prices their services very differently depending on whether the customer uses them through the Internet or through a branch. Since these services cannot be resold, arbitrage will not impose restrictions on the sustainable price difference. Computer companies, on the other hand, cannot price their products too differently on conventional and electronic channels since there are numerous firms selling "grey" computer products that have incentives to resell computers purchased cheaply on one channel on another channel.
Firms determine the ease with which consumers can find out about their products on each of their channels. Mail-order companies such as L.L.Bean and J. Crew, for example, decide on the detail with which a product is described and on the quality of the picture showing the product. A loudspeaker manufacturer with company owned retail stores such as Cambridge Soundworks decides whether to build listening rooms in which customers can evaluate the company's speakers and also sets guidelines for the amount of time that sales assistants spend helping consumers compare speakers. In both cases, the ease with which consumers can determine how much they like a company's product depends on choices that the firm makes. To model this, let and be the search costs incurred by consumers that firm sets on the conventional channel and the electronic channel respectively. I assume that search costs can assume two values only, high or low, . "High" means sufficiently high that a consumer that has determined the value of searching will choose not to search and "low" means sufficiently low that the consumer will choose to search. This assumption simplifies the model significantly but does not change the qualitative results that are relevant for this paper. 3 An alternative interpretation of is to think of firms as choosing whether or not to make available to consumers information that would help them determine their willingness to pay.
Once information has been made available by firms on the Internet, it is a reasonable approximation of reality that their costs are the same whether one or many consumers access that information. I thus assume that the marginal cost to a firm of facilitating consumer search for its product using the Internet (or the electronic channel in my notation) is zero. This is unlikely to hold true for a conventional channel. For example, if more consumers search through a firm's conventional channel, the firm 3 In a related paper (Zettelmeyer 2000 I thus set firms' marginal cost of facilitating consumer search through the electronic channel to zero while firms incur marginal costs per consumer that searches using the conventional channel. For the main part of this paper I assume that is not so large that a firm would rather exit the market than facilitate consumer search. 4 Firms set search costs and prices sequentially and know each other's search costs at the time they compete in prices. In the second step price game firms remain committed to the level of search costs that they chose in the first step.
5 For simplicity marginal cost of production are normalized to . Firms' equilibrium choices must satisfy:
(1) 2nd step:
(2) 1st step:
where and similar for the other strategic variables. Prices should be interpreted as margins over marginal costs. Consumers' demand is a function of prices and the search costs that each firm chooses to set.
Consumers
I introduce consumer demand in three steps. I first set up an explicit model of consumer behavior. Second, I derive the demand properties that directly result from this model. Third, I introduce the use simpler alternative demand functions that retain the key properties of the demands that are directly derived from the model of consumer behavior.
Consumer behavior
Assume that all consumers have access to the conventional channel. In addition, a fraction of consumers can use the electronic channel in order to search for information. All consumers who can use the electronic channel also have access to the conventional channel. 4 This can be stated more precisely as follows: Let be firm i's equilibrium profits as a function of the marginal cost of facilitating consumer search . Then, if , I assume that is not so large that . This assumption assures that the strategy of facilitating consumer search is not excluded categorically. 5 The usual interpretation is that search costs cannot be adjusted as quickly as prices. 
For some products, we can observe ex post that increased knowledge about the product category increases all or most consumers' perceived differentiation between products. 6 While a wine novice might not know the difference between a $10 bottle of red wine with the Pinot Noir grape and the Cabernet Sauvignon grape, a wine expert, for any particular meal, will not consider them to be particularly good substitutes. For many products, increased knowledge about the product category can lead to a decrease in consumers' perceived differentiation between products for some portion of the consumers. However, the perceived differentiation need not decrease for all consumers. For example, there will be consumers that even under full information prefer some feature of a Dell PC over that of other PCs. Many consumers, however, will feel that the difference between competing PCs is small once they have obtained full information about the competing computers.
The model of consumer behavior contained in this section is based on products that fall into this second category, i.e. products for which increased knowledge about the product category can lead to a decrease in consumers' perceived differentiation between products for some portion of the consumers.
Regardless of the category into which products fall, having no product specific knowledge implies that products are perceived as being undifferentiated (since there is no information with which to differentiate them).
Consumers know the prices of the offered products as well as some characteristics that are common to both offerings in the product category. 7 From their knowledge of the product category they are aware of the distribution from which their reservation prices are drawn. The uncertainty in this model lies in consumers not knowing ex ante the gross utility they will derive from the product of firm . 8 A consumer can find out her reservation price at firm by evaluating the firm's product. 6 Lynch and Ariely (2000) have recently confirmed this point. 7 By considering a consumer's purchasing problem at the stage after he or she has found out about the prices I do not imply that searching for price is less important a problem. It complicate this model while not facilitating the understanding of the simple intuitions that drive the results of this paper. For a model that links providing information (advertising) with knowledge of prices and products see Grossman and Shapiro (1984) . They find that the elasticity of demand that firms face is higher under full information. This is similar to the outcome of the model of consumer behavior in the next subsection. 8 I will use "reservation price" or "willingness to pay" synonymously with .
Conventional channel
Electronic channel
In doing so she incurs search cost or , depending on whether she chooses (and has access to) the conventional or the electronic channel.
Consumers' reservation prices are distributed uniformly between 0 and 1. Consumers' willingness to pay for firm 1's and firm 2's products are and respectively. Note that two consumers' uncertainty about their willingness to pay for firm 's product are uncorrelated. This corresponds to a product for which consumers are not uncertain about the quality of the product (vertical quality dimension)
but instead about what product characteristics mean to them (horizontal taste dimension). 9 Consumers' reservation prices are identically but not necessarily independently distributed across products. I assume the following correlation structure between reservation prices and : if a consumer searches at firm and learns her reservation price then with probability her reservation price at firm is identical to the reservation price she just learned, i.e. . With probability the reservation price at firm is different, in which case her best estimate about her reservation price at firm is her prior (1/2). 10 Consumers have correct beliefs, i.e. after having searched both products 1/2 of consumers find that their reservation prices for both products are identical, the remaining consumers find that their reservation prices for both products are different. Consumers do not know ex ante to which group they belong. 11 This correlation structure and the distribution of consumers' reservation prices is common knowledge. The discrete nature of this correlation structure is assumed for convenience only. It can be shown that the main result of this paper carries over to a model in which consumers' correlations between reservation prices and are distributed continuously as long as there is a sufficient number of consumers that consider both products relatively good substitutes. In the discrete correlation structure used in this paper the results require analogously that there be a sufficiently large mass of consumers who, after having searched both firms, have identical reservation prices. It is not essential that this mass be 1/2.
The consumers' possible search and purchase decisions over firms are illustrated in figure 1. In addition, for each search or purchase decision consumers have the choice to use the conventional or electronic channel (if they have access to the latter):
9 This setup simplifies the model by ensuring that a price can't signal to a consumer whether she will have a high or low willingness to pay for a firm's product. 10 In other words, if , then is independent of . 11 The results of this paper require that consumers don't know ex ante whether or not their valuation for both products is identical. This assumption ensures that the search process does not degenerate.
Figure 1: Consumers' search and purchase decisions over firms
A consumer has the option to buy from either firm on any available channel without searching for her reservation price, to search either firm through any channel she has access to, or to pass altogether. 12 If she does not search, the consumer's expected willingness to pay for products 1 and 2 is
. If she has decided to search at firm she knows her reservation price at that firm as well as her reservation price at firm with probability , yielding an expected willingness to pay for product . With this knowledge she can decide to buy at either firm on any channel available to her, to pass, or to search at firm through any channel she has access to. If the consumer searches at firm she has full information, i.e. she knows and and decides to buy from one of the firms on any channel that is available to her or to pass. There is no additional information gained from having searched one firm on both channels.
Properties of demand
We can now derive the properties of consumer demand that results from this model of consumers behavior. Consumers' decision rule in the search process becomes very simple by the assumption that firms' choice of search costs is restricted to two values only, high or low, . Consumers that face high search costs from firm i on all channels to which they have access will not search firm i. Consumer that face low search costs from firm i on at least one channel to which they have access will search 12 An example of a consumer that buys from a channel without having searched for her reservation price over that channel is an order placed at a mail order firm using a 1-800 number. 
for their willingness to pay for product i. Since a consumer with access to the electronic channel will buy firm 's product in the channel that offers the lower price, firm 's demand from such consumers depends only on the smaller of its prices and as well as the smaller of firm 's prices and .
For consumers without access to the electronic channel, the lowest price for firm 's product is . The effective price a consumer faces for firm i's product or "minimal price," can be defined as where is an indicator variable that equals if consumers have access to the electronic channel and equals if they do not.
The key property of the demand functions is that the elasticities of demand with respect to price differ according to consumers' information. Consider consumers that have not searched either firm and thus decide between purchasing at firms 1 and 2 in stage 1. Their expected utilities from purchases at firm 1 and firm 2 are and respectively. Irrespective of their true reservation price (because it is unknown to them at this stage), consumers will choose to purchase from the firm with the lower price. The firm with the lower price will get the entire demand from these consumers. Thus, the elasticity of demand is 0 for and infinite at .
Now consider consumers that have searched for firm 1's product and are consequently at stage 2.
These consumers now know their reservation prices at firm 1 and know that their reservation prices at firm 2 corresponds to those at firm 1 with probability 1/2. A consumer's utility from buying at firm 1 thus is and the expected utility from buying at firm 2 is . This means that buying at firm 1 is preferred to buying at firm 2 for . The demand for firm 1 is the fraction of consumers for whom and . The demand for firm 2 is the fraction of consumers for whom and for whom the expected value of buying product 2 is non-negative, . Since the proportion of realizations of that fall above will change continuously with and , the demand that results from these consumers is a continuous function of prices. Thus, there are no discontinuities in demand from these consumers.
Consider finally consumers that have searched both firms and thus know both reservation prices, and . One half of these consumers find that , the rest will find that . Those consumers with identical reservation prices across firms will buy from the firm with the lower price.
Those consumers with different reservation prices will buy at firm 1 as long as . Their demand for firm 1 is thus the fraction for whom and and analogously for
Overall, the firms' demand from consumers that have searched both firms will be continuous where , with a discrete jump at (because the 1/2 consumers with equal reservation prices switch firms at this price). Thus, both firms' demands from consumers that have searched both firms have the same, non-zero demand elasticity with respect to price for all . At , consumers who are indifferent between the two products yield demand is infinitely elastic.
Consumer demand
The demand functions that result when consumers have searched both products (the last case) are quadratic in prices and render the desired analysis of competition across channels unfeasible. I thus propose demand functions that are simpler while retaining the key properties of the demands that are directly derived from the model of consumer behavior.
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Recall that the effective price a consumer faces for firm i's product is defined by where is an indicator variable that equals if consumers have access to the electronic channel and equals if they do not. Since consumers vary in the number of channels they can access, the total demand that each firm faces is a linear combination of the following demand functions with and weighted by the size of the two segments where I propose the following demand functions:
where In equation 3, stands for the fraction of consumers that have the same (expected) willingness to pay for either firm's product. Variables and capture whether consumers have searched at firm and respectively. Consumers have searched at firm if and only if . This simplified demand 13 In a related paper (Zettelmeyer 2000) I use the explicit demand functions directly derived from a model of consumer behavior analogous to the one presented in section 3.2.1. From the model of consumer behavior we know that consumers that have searched no firm consider the products of both firms identical since they have no information other than price that might differentiate the products. We represent this in the simplified demand through . 14 In this case,
Clearly demand is infinitely elastic with respect to price at and 0 for .
Consumers that have searched one firm only have no uncertainty about their willingness to pay at that firm but are imperfectly informed about their willingness to pay at the other firm. In the model of consumer behavior their choice is determined by their individual valuation of the product at the firm they searched, the expectation of their valuation at the other firm and both firms' prices. As a result, each consumer will derive a different utility from each product. We represent this in the simplified demand through . If consumers have searched, for example, firm only, demand becomes a continuous function of price:
In the model of consumer behavior, half of consumers that have searched both firms find out that their valuation of both products is identical. The remaining consumers determine that they have different valuations for each product. We represent this in the simplified demand through . The consumers that consider the products identical decide solely on the basis of which minimal price is lower, while the other half 's demand is continuous in minimal prices. Thus demand is
14 Price does not carry any signal about consumers' willingness to pay. For a discussion see page 16.
Clearly, the elasticity of demand with respect to minimal price is non-zero for and infinite for .
In summary, demand depends on which firm and how many firms have been searched. These simplified demand functions have the key properties of the demands that were directly derived from the model of consumer behavior in section 3.2.1.
Assume that consumers will search the product of firm on any channel to which they have access and on which firm sets low search costs. There is no additional information gained from having searched one firm on both channels. Hence, if a firm offers low search costs on both channels, I assume that consumers with access to both channels randomly select on which channel to search. Consumers without access to the electronic channel will only search firm 's product if , i.e. if firm 's search costs on the conventional channel are low.
A firm's total cost of facilitating consumers' search (setting search cost low) depends on the number of consumers that search the firm's product using the conventional channel. A firm setting will not incur any cost of facilitating consumer search. By setting all consumers that can only use the conventional channel will search. If at the same time the remaining consumers, who have access to both channels, will also search on the conventional channel, while if only half of the consumers with access to both channels will search the conventional channel.
Total demand for each firm can be constructed from equations 4 through 6. Notice that not all consumers will have searched the same number of firms. If, for example, firms set on the conventional and on the electronic channel there is a fraction of consumers who do not have access to the electronic channel and thus will have searched for their willingness to pay at firm 1 only. Demand for these consumers will be determined by equation 5, i.e. and . The remaining fraction of consumers will have searched both firms. Demand for these consumers is specified by equation 6, i.e. and (for ).
Solution
I solve for pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria in the usual way. First, I calculate the price equilibria of the second step price game for all possible first step strategies. Then, using the payoffs from the price
subgame I calculate the subgame perfect equilibria of the overall game. Throughout this paper I restrict myself to pure strategy equilibria in both search costs and prices.
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I first rule out search cost strategies which will not be used in the first step. Firm can choose to set either high or low search costs for each of the two channels. Notice, however, that setting low search costs on the conventional and high search costs on the electronic channel leads to the same demand as setting low search costs on both channels. This insight leads to proposition 1. I also rule out search cost strategies by assuming without loss of generality that the firm with lower search costs is firm 1. Calculating price equilibria for the remaining pairs of search cost strategies and comparing payoffs leads to the results of this section.
To establish a base case, I first consider the situation in which no consumers have access to the electronic channel . Proposition 2 is based on the derivation of the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Proof of proposition 2: see appendix
The intuition for this result is most easily understood by looking at consumer demand as a function of search costs. If consumers will search neither firm. Consumer demand will be given by equation 4. Since undercutting the competitor's price by an infinitesimal amount will generate a discontinuous jump in demand, firms will compete prices down to marginal cost ( ).
If , demand will be given by equation 6. Although demand elasticities are non-zero for 15 See page 24 for a discussion of the pure strategy restriction.
, demand still jumps at , resulting in an incentive for any firm with a higher price to undercut the competitor's price slightly in order to gain the additional demand of . However, in contrast to this case will not result in marginal cost pricing. Analogous to the familiar result from the sales promotion literature, this case has no equilibrium in pure strategies (Varian 1980; Narasimhan 1988; Lal 1990; Raju, Srinivasan and Lal 1990; Hess and Gerstner 1992) . Setting manipulates consumers' information in such a way that demand becomes continuous in prices. The result is a pure strategy equilibrium of the price game with positive profits. Clearly this last case is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game. This shows that manipulating consumer information provides a mechanism for raising prices by committing firms not to compete for customers with the same valuations since differentiating on the information provided to consumers leads to maximally heterogeneous consumer valuations.
Note that prices in this model do not convey any information about product quality. Since a consumer's willingness to pay is uncorrelated with the willingness to pay of other consumers, a price can't signal to a consumer whether she will have a high or low willingness to pay for a firm's product.
I obtain the main result of this paper by characterizing the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies when consumers have access to the electronic channel: Proof of proposition 3: see appendix. Figure 2 illustrates how firms' search cost strategies depend on the fraction of consumers that can use the electronic channel.
Figure 2: Equilibrium search costs as a function of
If few consumers have access to the electronic channel, i.e. is small, firm 1 simply replicates its conventional search cost strategy onto the electronic channel by setting since doing so induces some consumers to search via the electronic channel and thus reduces firm 1's cost of providing information. Firm 2 will not use the same strategy as it does on the conventional channel, instead setting low search cost on the electronic channel, . Firm 2 has an incentive to offer low search cost because it can gain all the electronic channel consumers who, after having searched both firms, realize that their willingness to pay for the product at either firm is identical and thus buy from lower-priced firm 2.
If both firms set low search costs on the conventional channel, the result would be price undercutting and profit erosion. Why doesn't this happen on the electronic channel as long as is small? Firm 1 would like undercut firm 2's electronic channel price by a small amount to gain those consumers for whom the products are identical. But since firm 's electronic and conventional channel prices can differ by no more that without inducing arbitrage, undercutting firm 2 on the electronic channel by setting requires a price reduction on the conventional channel to ensure that . Hence, as long as the fraction of consumers that can be gained by undercutting firm 2 is small, i.e. is small, firm 1's loss in profit on the conventional channel due to the reduction in is higher than the potential gain on the electronic channel.
Clearly, the smaller the price differential , the larger will the price cut on the conventional channel have to be in order to allow firm 1 to undercut firm 2's price on the electronic channel. This implies that the smaller is, the larger is and hence the larger the fraction of consumers that firm 2 can gain by informing consumers without inducing a competitive reaction by firm 1 (Figure 3) .
Figure 3: Cutoff as a function of the maximum price difference
Once the size of the electronic channel exceeds , firm 1 is no longer willing to respond to firm 2's low electronic channel search costs by foregoing profits on the electronic channel in order to avoid cutting prices on the conventional channel. In order to avoid triggering a price war, firm 2 reverts to replicating its conventional channel strategy of high search costs on the electronic channel. Thus,
for intermediate values of , the addition of an electronic channel does not change firms' competitive interaction compared to the one-channel setup. 16 Since consumers' information structure is identical on both channels each firm chooses to set the same price on the conventional and the electronic channel. Note that firm 's cost of facilitating consumer search is the same for a given , whether is below or above . Hence the marginal cost of facilitating consumer search has no influence on .
As the size of the electronic channel approaches that of the conventional channel, , firm 1 changes from a low search cost to a high search cost strategy on the conventional channel. By doing so, since firm 1's prices are higher than firm 2's prices, firm 1 will not sell to any of the consumers that have access only to the conventional channel and will hence not have searched either firm.
How can this be advantageous to firm 1? There are two reasons. First, firm 1 can eliminate its cost of facilitating consumer search. However, even if firm 1 has an incentive to set . The consumers that have no information about either firm are sensitive only to whether one firm's price is lower than the other firm's price (as long as the price does not exceed consumers' reservation price). This creates an incentive for firm 2 to raise its price on the conventional channel and, because prices can't differ by more than , also on the electronic channel. Since the prices of firms 1 and 2 are 16 The magnitude of depends on the size of the consumer segment that considers both products perfect substitutes (assumed to be 1/2 in this model). It can be shown that increases as fewer consumers consider both products perfect substitutes--conditional of this segment remaining large enough to ensure that the result of this paper hold. This suggests that for a given reach of the Internet, firms' Internet search cost strategies should vary across product categories if the categories differ in the size of consumer segments that consider products close substitutes. 
strategic complements (Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer 1985) , firm 1 reacts by raising prices and reaping more profits from the consumers (which still consider purchasing at firm 1). For this competitive effect outweighs having lost the fraction of the consumers that bought from firm 1 when it informed them. Firm 1 effectively gives firm 2 some market power in the sense that the consumers will only shop at firm 2 as long as . Since the critical level is determined by whether firm 1 has an incentive to gain customers by undercutting firm 2's price, not by incentives related to search costs, is not a function of firms' marginal cost of facilitating consumer search . 17 The implication of the fact that both and are not influenced by marginal costs of facilitating consumer search, is that firms' strategy response to a different reach of the Internet is driven by competitive, not cost considerations.
Clearly, the larger the maximum price differential , the smaller the price cut on the conventional channel has to be in order to allow firm 1 to undercut firm 2's price on the conventional channel, since firm 2 brings closer to as increases. This implies that the larger , the smaller the region and hence the fraction of uninformed consumers that can be sustained in equilibrium. Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between and .
Figure 4: Cutoff as a function of the maximum price difference
Proposition 3 implies that the number of consumers that are informed about one or both firms' products varies with the size of the electronic channel. Proposition 4 captures this insight.
Proposition 4: An electronic channel will initially increase the number of informed consumers. A further increase in its size, however, will not lead to more informed consumers and will ultimately lead to fewer informed consumers than in a conventional channel alone. 18
17 Increasing raises firm 1's increase in profits from setting instead of . However, conditional on firm 1 having no incentive to undercut firm 2's price on the conventional channel and gain those consumers that can use the conventional channel only, setting dominates setting even for . 
Proof of proposition 5: see appendix
As long as the reach of the electronic channel is small, , the search cost strategies as described in proposition 3 will be low search costs for firm 1 on both channels and high search costs on the conventional but low search costs on the electronic channel for firm 2. The resulting conventional channel prices will be higher for firm 1 than for firm 2. On the electronic channel firm 2 cannot charge higher prices than on the conventional channel because all the electronic channel consumers can also buy on the conventional channel. Since consumers on the electronic channel are informed about both goods, firm 1 will lower its price relative to the conventional channel (but not by more than ), making average prices on the electronic channel lower.
As the reach of the electronic channel increases, , firms pursue the same search cost strategies on both channels. They face therefore the same situation in each channels, resulting in identical equilibrium prices across channels.
As the reach of the electronic channel approaches that of the conventional channel, , low search costs are only set by firm 1 on the electronic channel. Consumers who have access to the electronic channel will be informed about firm 1's product but not about firm 2's, and firm 2's prices will be lower than firm 1's. On the conventional channel, no consumers are informed, so the firms compete on the basis of price alone. Firm 1 would thus like to reduce its price relative to the electronic channel, but cannot without causing electronic channel consumers to switch to the conventional channel. As a result firm 2 can raise its prices on the conventional channel relative to the electronic channel 18 For the number of uninformed consumers decreases in . For the same number of consumers as in the conventional channel alone will be informed.
(but not by more than ), while still undercutting firm 1's conventional channel price. Electronic channel prices are thus on average lower than on the conventional channel.
Profits of the competing firms depend both on the cost of facilitating consumer search and the reach of the electronic channel. Figure 5 illustrates firms' equilibrium profits and the corresponding search cost strategies as functions of the size of the electronic channel for and .
Figure 5: Equilibrium profits as a function of for
Firm 1's profits can initially rise or fall as the reach of the electronic channel increases. While firm 1 is losing consumers to firm 2, an increase in the reach of the electronic channel decreases firm 1's costs of facilitating search to consumers. Firm 2's profits increase since it is initially gaining additional consumers by informing on the electronic channel while offering a lower price than firm 1. Once the reach of the electronic channel exceeds , firm strategies mimic the case without an electronic channel.
Firm 1's profits, however, are higher than in the one-channel case and also increase in since fewer consumers use the conventional channel to search. When , firm 1's increases search costs on the conventional channel and thereby eliminates its cost of facilitating consumer search, and also gives firm 2 some market power which induces higher prices and profits. Proposition 6 states the generalizable results. Proof of proposition 6: see appendix
The effect of the Internet on competitiveness
The model so far has assumed that facilitating consumer search over the conventional channel would be costly but not be prohibitively so. 19 While the results of this paper can be derived under this assumption of bounded costs of facilitating consumer search, one important insight about the effect of the Internet on the competitiveness of markets is lost. I now relax the assumption that consumers can always be informed without driving profits down to zero. This allows me to evaluate the commonly hypothesized belief that the Internet necessarily increases competition between firms.
There is evidence of a rise in consumers' average valuation of time (or disutility from search). Causes include increasing working hours, more families in which both adults have full time jobs, and increasing commuting times. If consumers' disutility from search increases, firms will need to make search particularly easy if they are to induce consumers to search. We can model this as an increase in firms' marginal cost of facilitating consumer search over a conventional channel, .
Assume that firms and consumers are modeled exactly as before in section 3.1, only that the marginal cost of facilitating consumer search is not bounded from above. We can then highlight the Internet's role on a market's competitiveness:
Proposition 7: If the marginal cost of facilitating consumer search is large relative to the fraction of consumers that can use the electronic channel , firms engage in ruinous price competition. A rise in the reach of the electronic channel relieves some of this competitive pressure by reducing firms' total cost of providing information to consumers.

Proof of proposition 7: see appendix
If the marginal cost of facilitating consumer search is very high, setting low search cost on the conventional channel leads to negative profits for firm 1. Firm 1 will thus not facilitate consumer search 19 See footnote 4 for a precise formulation.
on the conventional channel, even if doing to leads to marginal cost pricing and zero profits. As the reach of the Internet increases, an increasing number of consumers with access to both channels choose to search for their willingness to pay for firm 1's product using the electronic channel -at marginal cost to firm 1 of zero instead of . This reduces firm 1's total cost of facilitating consumer search anddepending on -enables firm 1 to make positive profits while setting low search cost on the conventional channel. The higher , the larger has to be the reach of the electronic channel in order to reestablish an equilibrium with positive profits for both firms.
If there is no electronic channel, high marginal cost of facilitating consumer search is sufficient to induce ruinous price competition between firms. If the electronic channel is accessible universally, firms can avoid ruinous price competition, no matter how expensive it is to inform consumers using the conventional channel.
Discussion
The key theoretical insight of this paper is that firms can strategically use information on multiple channels to achieve finer consumer segmentation. This result holds even if the underlying preferences of consumers do not differ across channels, i.e. without assuming that, for example, users of the Internet have on average a higher taste for quality than those using conventional channels. Competing on multiple channels allows firms to provide selected groups of consumers with different amounts of information and thereby differentially affect consumers' expected utility. Firms can exploit this segmentation to increase their market power. This is the driving force behind most results in this paper. The results suggest that a proliferation of channels will not increase but decrease competition between firms.
Although the paper assumes characteristics of a second channel that are particularly appropriate to modeling the Internet, the findings should generalize to other channels, as long as these channels (a) clearly segment consumers and (b) enable firms to facilitate consumer search at not too high a cost.
Limitations
The firms modeled in this paper are vertically integrated. The results hence apply only to firms with direct distribution. Whether the results generalize to channels with intermediaries will depend on the way in which manufacturers (assuming that the firms in this model are considered retailers) are added to the model. Throughout the paper I restrict myself to pure strategy equilibria in search costs and prices. For search costs this is not problematic. They are set in the first step of the game and are assumed to be observable before entering the pricing stage. Because of search costs' commitment value in this model, a mixed strategy has no easy interpretation. The results of this paper will continue to hold even if mixing in prices is allowed as long as is sufficiently large, meaning that there is a sizeable fraction of consumers that, after searching both firms, have identical reservation prices.
The reach of the Internet is considered to be given exogenously. Although this is most likely a reasonable assumption in the short run, there is little doubt that firms' actions will influence how many consumers make use of the Internet. This model should therefore be taken as a primarily static model that analyzes the nature of competition at one moment in time.
A further limitation of this paper is that the maximum price difference is exogenously given.
Firms might be able to limit arbitrage between channels by, for example, voiding warranties of products that we not sold through authorized outlets. Finally, one might conjecture that arbitrage opportunities increase with the number of consumers that can access both the conventional and the electronic channel. In that case will also depend on the overlap between the two channels.
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Model extensions
Other sources of information
The model in this paper assumes that a firm is the only source of information that can help consumers determine their exact reservation prices for the firm's product. An interesting extension to the model consists of introducing third party sources of information. Such an extension would require a more detailed model of consumers' search decisions in which consumers traded off the costs and benefits of searching third party information sources and each of the firms. In practice, little relevant information is free to consumers, either because it is made available by commercial firms, or because third party information providers don't reach all consumers, or because collecting "free" information can be very time consuming to the consumer. Whether the results of this paper continue to hold depends on con-20 One can vary, for example, the number of manufacturers, their choice variables, and whether they can only supply one or both of the retailers.
21 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. β α ( ) δ δ sumers' costs and benefits of using an information source. If, for example, the cost of accessing third party information that reveals to consumers their reservation price for product is lower than the value of such information to most consumers and if firm would want to withhold this information, this paper's results would not hold. A firm's choice of determining consumers' search costs for their products would be meaningless. If third-party information is costly relative to its value to consumers, such that few consumers would obtain information about their exact willingness to pay -unless the firm itself facilitates consumer search-I expect the results of this paper to be unaffected.
Heterogeneous consumer beliefs
The model makes three assumptions about the heterogeneity of consumer beliefs. First, I have assumed that consumers' reservation prices are drawn from a common distribution. Second I have assumed that consumers' priors correspond to their average posterior, i.e. that they don't have the "wrong" expectations about the utility they will derive from a firm's product. Finally, I have assumed a distribution of true reservation prices in which the reservation prices of half the consumers are the same across firms.
Consider first allowing prior reservation prices for a firm's products to differ across consumers. The results of my model require a mass of consumers that in the absence of product information purchase whichever product is cheaper; it is not necessary that all consumers share a common prior. For product categories for which this assumption is not reasonable, this model will not be appropriate.
Relaxing the second assumption, if consumers have too high or low expectations regarding their reservation prices, firms' incentive to withhold or reveal information will change. A firm, for example, for whose product consumers have average posteriors that surpass their priors will have an incentive to facilitate consumer search. The action that firms ultimately take will depend on the relative magnitude of incentives stemming from incorrect priors and the competitive effect that comes from having informed or uninformed consumers. By assuming that priors are consistent with posteriors this paper has highlighted incentives to withhold information from consumers, even if firms have "nothing to hide." Even without relaxing the third assumption, consumers' true reservation prices are heterogeneous but on average correlated across firms. The applicability of the model is limited to product categories where a sufficiently large fraction of consumers with full information consider the offered products good substitutes. Examples might be audio equipment, televisions, computers and many market where generics or "clones" are prominent. If full information makes consumers' preferences perfectly heterogeneous, the results will not hold.
i i Heterogeneous search costs
The model in this paper assumes that consumers search for their willingness to pay for the product of a firm if the firm facilitates consumer search and does not search if the firm sets search costs high. The realism of the model can be increased by relaxing the assumption that all consumers face identical search costs, namely those set by each firm. The results will depend on the way in which firms' strategy space is modified to account for consumers' different reactions to a firms' decision to facilitate search.
Suppose, for example, that firms can determine the degree to which they would like to facilitate consumer search. If a firm increases the extent to which it facilitates search, more consumers will search but the firm incurs (on the conventional channel at least), a higher marginal cost of facilitating search.
We can expect firms to choose their search cost strategies on the basis of the following three considerations: (1) for every level of a pure strategy equilibrium with positive profits can only be sustained if a sufficiently small number of consumers either have no information or full information about their reservation prices, (2) a positive mass of consumers with no information or full information endows firm 2 with some market power and hence increases profits for both firms, and (3) firm 1 will choose to facilitate search as little as is consistent with (1) and (2) since more facilitation increases marginal cost.
We can expect many circumstances in which the main results of this paper continue to hold. However, it will be possible to find cases where the marginal cost of facilitating search and the distributions of consumers' search costs will make some equilibria unsustainable, and hence change the results of this paper. The complexity of introducing heterogeneous search costs requires further research to determine circumstances under which the results will generalize.
Internet directions and managerial implications
The results of this paper make predictions about directions the Internet might take and also have implications for managerial decisions. The paper also hypothesizes some firm behavior that should be currently observable. It is important to keep in mind that this paper only deals with a subset of the possible factors affecting firms' information and pricing strategies. For example, one of the effects that I do not consider in this paper are the different costs of marketing and distributing products over the Internet.
While this is likely to influence the use of the Internet, I have excluded cost factors from consideration α in order to highlight implications that arise from purely strategic issues in competing in search costs and prices.
Examples of pricing and communication strategies
For most products currently offered, the Internet only reaches a limited large set of potential customers for the product. Exceptions are products that are exclusively distributed over the Internet such as shareware or Internet search services -a scenario that is not modeled in this paper. I thus expect most product markets to be characterized by the model's "small" Internet scenario.
Two predictions stand out. First, we should observe that some companies price lower on the Internet than on their conventional channel. Second we should observe that companies facilitate consumer search more (or at least as much) on the Internet than they do on their conventional channel. The examples I list below do not rule out alternative explanations but they show that there are examples consistent with the predictions of this paper. 22 Excluding alternative explanations requires a much more complex empirical study.
There are numerous firms that charge substantially lower prices for identical products on the Internet. Barnes and Noble, for example, has the following pricing strategy in their stores: hardcover New York Times bestsellers are sold at 30% discount off the publisher's suggested price; softcover New York Times bestsellers are sold at a 20% discount; other hardcover books are discounted 10%; other softcover books are not discounted. On the Internet, Barnes and Noble discounts all hardcover books by 30% and all softcover books by 20%. Another example is Broderbund software. Customers that order on their website receive a $5 discount per order on any of the company's products. This anecdotal evidence is confirmed by Brynjolfsson and Smith (1999) who find that prices on the Internet are 9-16% lower than prices in conventional outlets, depending on whether taxes, shipping and shopping costs are included in the price.
Most of these companies facilitate consumer search on the Internet to a higher degree than their normal channels. Barnes and Noble, for example, makes book reviews available on their website and presents the current bestsellers for many categories of books. Broderbund describes each of their software in detail and allows consumers to download demo versions of some products. Most US airlines (American, US-Airways, Continental, etc.) offer "E-Savers" for flights departing from major US cities on Saturday and returning Sunday, Monday, or Tuesday. This information is advertised only to Internet 22 These examples are as of August 1997 users. Several computer companies led by Dell, run web-sites that allow consumers to customize computer systems to exactly fit their needs and link into reviews and product comparisons.
In summary, while it is possible to find alternative explanations for each of these examples, we cannot rule out that the forces described in this paper have some effect on the observed phenomena.
Possible directions for the Internet
Explosion of information
• The current explosion of information by vendors on the Internet might be attributable to the Internet's comparatively small reach. The results of this paper suggest that a firm that does not facilitate consumer search on the conventional channel will provide more information on the Internet -but only as long as the Internet's reach is limited. As the reach of the Internet increases, firms are more likely to replicate their conventional channel strategies on the Internet.
Profits and prices
• We can expect firms' average Internet prices to be lower than their prices on a conventional channel as long as the Internet's reach is limited, even if the Internet's marginal cost of facilitating consumer search is not significantly lower than over a conventional channel. As the Internet becomes more mainstream, competitive reasons need not lower firms' Internet prices below those on a conventional channel. There might, however, be numerous reasons not discussed in this paper that can lead to price declines even in the later stages of the Internet. An important reason might be lower marginal costs of producing and distributing some products over the Internet. Some software companies, for example, offer lower priced "download-only" versions of programs over the Internet.
• Firms' profits might initially rise, even if the Internet does not increase the size of the market. This is because the Internet enhances firms' capability to segment consumers by informing them selectively, thereby increasing their market power. This result might hold even if the consumer base of firms is not expanded through the Internet. Once the Internet is more mainstream, firms might no longer be able to maintain higher profits relative to the pre-Internet days, except through the reduction of costs to facilitate consumer search.
Importance of the Internet
• Firms might find it optimal to shift their "high service" presence to the Internet. As the Internet approaches full coverage of potential consumers it might be in firms' best interest to abandon the conventional channel as a means of facilitating consumers' search. Information to consumers might then be transmitted over the Internet. This allows firms to soften competition and charge higher average prices.
• The Internet can ease the competitive pressures that could arise if consumers' disutility of search increases. For certain products it will allow firms to lower consumer search cost below the level economically possible over conventional retail channels. This might allow firms to regain the advantage of differentiating on search costs and thus soften price competition.
Managerial implications
Firms' Internet strategies • It is not necessarily optimal for firms to simply duplicate their conventional pricing and communications strategies on the Internet. Consider, for example, a firm that is a low service retailer. As long as the reach of the Internet is limited, it might be in the retailer's best interest to change its profile on the Internet towards facilitating consumer search. Replicating its conventional channel strategy, on the other hand, should be optimal for a firm that does facilitate consumer search on a conventional channel; it will gain cost advantages by facilitating consumer search on the Internet as well. The optimal Internet strategy will thus depend on the reach of the Internet as well as the competitive situation in both channels.
• Firms might want to limit the size of consumer segments that are offered low or high search costs.
The "reach of the Internet" as used in this paper is not equivalent to the number of households that could potentially use the Internet. What is of importance is the size of the consumer segment that uses the Internet to find out about a particular product category. The technology on the Internet might permit firms to artificially limit the reach of the Internet by restricting information to certain types of consumers. This way the competitive advantages of the Internet might be maintained even if many potential consumers have access to the Internet.
• Multi-product firms might want differentiated Internet strategies for each of their products. Depending on the segment sizes of potential consumers that use the Internet for different product categories, firms might want to facilitate consumer search in some and make search hard in other product categories.
Importance of the Internet
• If the marginal cost of facilitating consumer search through the Internet is lower than through a conventional channel, firms whose communications strategy aims to inform consumers have the most to gain from the Internet since some of their customers can be expected to move to the Internet to obtain information.
• Information for some types of products will be inherently less costly to provide over the Internet than over other channels. For these products the Internet will reinforce firms' abilities to differentiate themselves in the degree of information provision.
Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes ways in which the existence and the size of the Internet affect firms' optimal pricing and communications strategies. It takes into account that firms' dealings on the Internet could be dependent on the strategies these firms pursue over other outlets.
The main results of this paper are that the amount of information provided by firms as well as their prices depend on the reach of the Internet. If the Internet is "small," more information is likely to be provided than through a conventional channel alone. Also, average prices on the Internet are likely to be lower than on the conventional channel. If the Internet is "large," there need not be more information provided and average prices need not be lower than through a conventional channel alone.
The general theoretical contribution of this paper is to show that firms can strategically use information on multiple channels to achieve finer consumer segmentation. This result holds even if the underlying preferences of consumers do not differ across channels. Competing on multiple channels allows firms to provide selected groups of consumers with different amounts of information and thereby differentially affect consumers' expected utility. Firms can exploit this segmentation to increase their market power. It is also shown that the Internet in particular can relieve some of the competitive pressure that arises from consumers with a high disutility of search.
Although the results in this paper are based on a model that attempts to characterize the Internet, the findings should generalize to other channels, as long as these channels allow firms to segment consumers and enable them to facilitate consumer search at low cost.
This paper contributes in three areas. First, it has pointed out possible directions the Internet might take. It has predicted future developments regarding the amount of information provided over the In-ternet, firms' pricing strategies, the profitability of competing on the Internet, and incentives for entry.
Second, the paper has derived implications for managers. It has discussed the duplication of conventional strategies onto the Internet, whether firms want to limit information, and how long-term profits might be affected. Third, this paper has made theoretical contributions. It has introduced channels as a means of segmenting consumers by selectively informing them. It has also shown that manipulating consumer information can be a powerful competitive tool. Finally, it has highlighted that the analysis of competition between firms can be strongly affected by considering all channels over which they compete.
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Proofs
Proof of proposition 2: proposition 2 results as a special case ( ) from proposition 3. See the proof of proposition 3.
Proof of propositions 3:
I first compute price equilibria and equilibrium profits of the price game for all possible search cost strategies, then I determine the subgame perfect equilibria of the overall game.
Preliminaries: Firm 's search costs come from the set . By proposition 1 is dominated by . Price equilibria have to be computed for the set of strategies:
Denote a firm's search cost strategy by 1, by 2, and by 3. Let m,n denote that firm is playing search cost strategy m and firm is playing search cost strategy n. 2,1, for example, refers 
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Proof of proposition 7:
(a) Fix any , say . Then, by propositions 3 there exists a pure strategy equilibrium with positive profits for . Let firm 's equilibrium profits be . We can write . Since profits are bounded from above such that
. Hence firm will not play a strategy for which . By proposition 3 there is no pure strategy equilibrium or pure strategy equilibrium with positive profits at which .
(b) Pick such that . Then by proposition 3 there exists a pure strategy equilibrium with positive profits. Q.E.D.
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